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Abstract
Anomaly detection is a difficult problem in many areas
and has recently been subject to a lot of attention. Clas-
sifying unseen data as anomalous is a challenging mat-
ter. Latest proposed methods rely on Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs) to estimate the normal data dis-
tribution, and produce an anomaly score prediction for
any given data. In this article, we propose a simple yet
new adversarial method to tackle this problem, denoted
as History-based anomaly detector (HistoryAD). It con-
sists of a self-supervised model, trained to recognize ’nor-
mal’ samples by comparing them to samples based on the
training history of a previously trained GAN. Quantitative
and qualitative results are presented evaluating its perfor-
mance. We also present a comparison to several state-of-
the-art methods for anomaly detection showing that our
proposal achieves top-tier results on several datasets.
1 Introduction
Anomaly detection usually refers to the identification of
unusual patterns that do not conform to expected be-
haviour of data, be it visual data such as images and
videos, or other modalities such as acoustics or nat-
ural language. Its applications are numerous and in-
clude the detection of anomalies in medical or biologi-
cal imaging such as failure of neurocognitive functions
in damaged brains [15, 40, 38], real-life image forgery
resulting in fake news or even fraud [19, 51, 48, 35],
anomaly detection in image or video for autonomous
Approximate density of anomaly score distribution for
each dataset.
test split CIFAR-10 CelebA Tiny ImageNet
AUPRC 0.941 0.976 0.949
Table 1. AUPRC for SVHN compared to other datasets.
Figure 1: Method trained on SVHN and evaluated on sev-
eral datasets.
navigation, driver assistance systems or surveillance sys-
tems for, e.g., violence alerting or evidence investiga-
tion [27, 30, 50, 34, 20, 11], or for detection of violation
and foul in sports analysis, detection of defective samples
in manufacturing industry [44, 52, 4], sea mines in side-
scan sonar images [29] or extrange aerial objects in aerial
images that may produce collisions [36], anomalies from
multi-modal data including visual data, audio data or nat-
ural language [25], to name but a few of its applications.
The precise definition of anomalous data is inherently
difficult as, in practice, an unexpected anomaly can be
detected only against the ground of a pattern regularity.
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This is one of the reasons that anomaly detection is fre-
quently approached as out-of-distribution or outlier detec-
tion. A detailed account of the many existing methods to
approach this problem can be found in [6, 37, 12, 5].
This paper proposes a new method for anomaly detec-
tion in the context of image processing that is based on the
unsupervised learning of the underlying probability dis-
tribution of normal data through appropriate GANs and
the proposal of a new anomaly score for the detection
of abnormal images. Our anomaly detector leverages a
recorded history of the normal data generator to fully dis-
criminate regions where true data points are more dense
and use this learning to successfully detect anomalies. It
results in a general anomaly detector that is free of as-
sumptions on the data and thus it can be applied in any
context and data modality. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of
the performance of our anomaly detector on structurally
different datasets. In this experiment, the distribution of
the Street View House Numbers (SVHN) dataset [32] is
first learned (details in Section 3) and considered as nor-
mal data. Then, our anomaly score is computed on sam-
ples of it and also from samples from the CIFAR-10 [24],
CelebA [26] and ImageNet [9] datasets. The approxi-
mated density of the anomaly score distribution for each
dataset is shown at the top of Fig. 1. Let us notice that, for
the normal data, its anomaly values are around −1 while
for all the ’anomalous’ datasets, the anomaly scores are
around +1. On the other hand, Table 1 in Fig. 1 bottom
shows the area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC).
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 re-
views related research. Section 3 details our proposal. In
Section 4, the model architecture and implementation de-
tails are provided while the experimental results are pre-
sented in Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 6.
2 Related Work
The automatic identification of abnormal or manipulated
data is crucial in many contexts [40, 42, 19, 48, 35, 50, 4].
Anomaly detection, has been a topic in statistics for cen-
turies (see [6, 37, 12, 5] and references therein). The au-
thors of [12] classify the methods in the literature by the
structural assumption made on the normality. Other works
challenge anomaly detection with unsupervised or self-
supervised learning strategies by taking advantage of the
huge amount of data frequently at our disposal [2, 41].
Some of them use generative models to learn the (nor-
mal) data distribution. Generative models are methods
that produce novel samples from high-dimensional data
distributions, such as images or videos. Currently the
most prominent approaches include autoregressive mod-
els [45], variational autoencoders (VAE) [23], and gen-
erative adversarial networks (GANs) [14]. GANs are of-
ten credited for producing less burry outputs when used
for image generation. In the anomaly detection context,
several approaches tackle it using autoencoders [13] or
GANs [41, 49, 8, 39, 17, 1, 21, 33] (we refer to [28]
for a summary of those GAN-based anomaly detection
methods). Some works focus on the implicit inversion
of the generator in order to detect anomalous data that
do not fall in the learned model [10, 17], while others
directly infer likelihoods with, for instance, normalizing
flows [22, 7, 18, 31, 43]. On the other hand, the recent
paper [13] uses a memory-augmented autoencoder which
learns and records a fixed number of prototypical normal
encoded vectors. Given an input sample, it is encoded and
the memory is then accessed with an attention-based mod-
ule to express this encoding by a sparse combination of
the stored normal prototypes that used to reconstruct the
input data via a decoder. The l2 distance between the in-
put and its reconstruction is used as anomaly score. Very
differently, our anomaly detector leverages the recorded
history of the normal data generator to fully discriminate
regions where true data points are more dense and use
this learning to successfully detect anomalies. The idea of
producing an anomaly score prediction for any given data
has also been investigated [17, 41, 1]. Our proposal fits
in the class of self-supervised approaches and it is trained
only on normal (non-anomalous) samples.
3 Proposed method
Let Pdata be the probability distribution of a given ’normal
images’ dataset. We will attribute an anomaly score to
any image. Inspired by some ideas in [21] and [33], this
score consists of the output of a network.
More precisely, our proposal is grounded on, first, the
learning of the probability distribution Pdata using a GAN
learning strategy while simultaneously keeping track of
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the states of the associated generator and discriminator
during training. Secondly, we create a probability distri-
bution (denoted as PGhist ) that combines different states
of the previous generator’s history. We finally train our
anomaly detector by computing the Total Variation dis-
tance between the real data distribution Pdata and PGhist . In
the following Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, these steps of our
approach are detailed and justified.
3.1 Learning to generate training-like data
As mentioned, a GAN-based adversarial strategy is fol-
lowed. Let us recall that the GAN strategy [14] is based
on a game theory scenario between two networks, the
generator and the discriminator, having adversarial objec-
tives. The generator maps a noise vector (of density PZ)
from the latent space to the image space trying to trick
the discriminator, while the discriminator receives either
a generated or a real image and must distinguish between
both. This procedure leads the probability distribution of
the generated data to be as close as possible, for some dis-
tance, to the one of the real data. For the Vanilla GAN
[14], the minimized distance is the Jensen-Shannon Di-
vergence, which has arguably bad properties (see Section
2 of [3] for details). The authors of [3] introduced the
idea of minimizing the Wasserstein-1 distance (denoted
asW1) instead. They proved several of its nice properties,
including its continuity and differentiability almost every-
where (under certain hypotheses). The Wasserstein-1 dis-
tance can be computed with Kantorovich duality property:
if P1 and P2 are two probability distributions, then
W1(P1,P2) = sup
D∈D
Ex∼P1 [D(x)]− Ey∼P2 [D(y)], (1)
where D is set of 1-Lipschitz functions, i.e., in the no-
tations of [46], the set of c-convex functions for the cost
function c(x, y) =| x− y |. Let G and D be the generator
and the discriminator learned by optimizing the adversar-
ial Wasserstein GAN loss (WGAN),
inf
G
sup
D∈D
Ex∼PG [D(x)]− Ex∼Pdata [D(x)] . (2)
Notice that the optimal dual variable D∗ obtained from
the optimization of (2) will be negative on real data sam-
ples and positive on generated ones. In this paper, we
(a) Empirical generated
distributions; color from
blue to red indicates the
progression of training.
(b) Comparison of Pdata and
PGhist and profile of optimal
D∗TV and trained DTV .
Figure 2: Method illustration on a toy one-dimensional
dataset of points sampled from a normal law.
use the learning strategy of [16] which is based on ap-
proximating the class D by neural networks D subject to
a gradient penalty (forcing the L2 norm of the gradient of
the discriminator with respect to its input to be close to
1). The choice of WGAN instead of other GAN losses
favours nice properties such as avoiding vanishing gradi-
ents and mode collapse, and achieves more stable training.
3.2 Generator’s history probability distri-
bution
Let us start by presenting the underlying idea. During
training (equation (2) and [16] algorithm), the discrimi-
nator D will indicate regions that may contain real data,
and G learns to produce samples in that zone. If these
zones do not contain real data, then the discriminator will
act as a critic and indicate it to the generator and point at
other regions. This way, screenshots of the generator dur-
ing training keep track of data points surrounding the real
data manifold. In this paper, we merge the screenshots of
the generator during training into
PGhist ,
∫ nepochs
α
c ·Gt(PZ) · e−βtdt, (3)
where Gt denotes the state of the generator at training
time t and PZ is the latent space distribution (parame-
ters α and β are discussed in Section 4). As a weighted
mean of training generated distributions, we may assume
3
(a) Discriminator score
output during training
(from blue to red).
(b) Average outputs of
discriminators versus
output of a average
coefficient discriminator.
Figure 3: Justification of DTV initialization on the toy
example.
by construction that PGhist covers Pdata. That is,
Hypothesis: supp (Pdata) ⊂ supp (PGhist) .
(4)
To illustrate our hypothesis and our whole method,
we present a proof of concept by creating a toy one-
dimensional dataset of points sampled from the normal
law. We then train the WGAN, with the generator initial-
ized with an offset so that it does not match training data.
As previously explained (details in Section 4) we save the
states of the generator. Fig. 2(a) displays empirical gener-
ated distributions of some of these states.
In order to satisfy Hypothesis (4), we use momentum
based optimizers, so that PG oscillates around Pdata (see
Fig. 2(a)), making the support of PGhist cover the one of
Pdata better (see Fig. 2(b), where Pdata and PGhist are, re-
spectively, plotted in black and red).
This empirically confirms the hypothesis in this toy
case.
3.3 Training our anomaly detector DTV
As announced above, we will compute the Total Variation
distance between Pdata and PGhist . Let us explain how and
why. Firstly, we recall the Total Variation distance defini-
tion:
δ(P1,P2) = sup
A Borel subset
|P1(A)− P2(A)| , (5)
which represents the choice c(x, y) = 1x 6=y in the opti-
mal transport problem, as stated in [46]. As noticed by
several authors (see, e.g., [3]), the topology induced by
the Total Variation distance is stronger that the one in-
duced by the Wasserstein-1 distance. Let us remark that
δ(P1,P2) = 12‖P1 − P2‖TV , where ‖ · ‖TV denotes the
Total Variation norm. The Kantorovich duality yields:
2 δ(P1,P2) = sup
−1≤D≤1
(Ex∼P1 [D(x)]− Ey∼P2 [D(y)]) .
(6)
From this equation (6), we infer our ideal training objec-
tive:
sup
−1≤D≤1
Ex∼PGhist [D(x)]− Ex∼Pdata [D(x)] . (7)
Let us notice that the optimal stateD∗ in (6) is completely
understood: Paraphrasing [3], take µ = P1 − P2, which
is a signed measure, and (P,N) its Hahn decomposition
(P = {dP1 > dP2}). Then, we can define D∗ := 1P −
1N , we have −1 ≤ D∗ ≤ 1, and
Ex∼P1 [D
∗(x)]− Ex∼P2 [D∗(x)] =
∫
D∗dµ
= µ(P )− µ(N)
= ‖µ‖TV
= 2 δ (P1,P2)
(8)
which closes the duality gap with the Kantorovitch opti-
mal transport primal problem, hence the optimality of the
dual variable D∗.
Now, we can approximate the Total Variation distance
between Pdata and PGhist by optimizing (7) over DTV , our
neural network approximation of the dual variable D.
Several authors (e.g., [8]) have pointed out that the
output of a discriminator obtained in the framework of
adversarial training is not fitted for anomaly detection.
Nevertheless, notice that our discriminator DTV deals
with two fixed distributions, Pdata and PGhist . Here, the
purpose of computing Total Variation distance is only
used to reach the optimal D∗TV in this well-posed prob-
lem, assuming Hypothesis (4). DTV should converge to
D∗TV = 1P − 1N where (P,N) is the Hahn decompo-
sition of dPGhist − dPdata (see Fig. 2(b), blue curve). Im-
portantly, we hope that thanks to the structure of the data
(PGhist covering Pdata),DTV will be able to generalize high
anomaly scores on unseen data. Again, this seems to hold
true in our simple case: The orange curve in Fig. 2 keeps
increasing outside of supp(PGhist).
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To avoid vanishing gradient issues, we enforce the
’boundedness’ condition on DTV not by a tanh non-
linearity (for instance), but by applying a smooth loss
(weighted by λ > 0) to its output:
λ · d(DTV (x), [−1, 1])2 (9)
where d(v, [−1, 1]) denotes the distance of a real value
v ∈ R to the set [−1, 1].
Our final training loss, to be minimized, reads:
L(D) =Ex∼Pdata [D(x)]− Ex∼PGhist [D(x)] (10)
+ λE
x∼ Pdata+PGhist2
[d(D(x), [−1, 1])2]
As proved in the Appendix, the optimal D for this problem
is D∗ = D∗TV + ∆
∗, with
∆∗(x) =
dPGhist(x)− dPdata(x)
λ(dPGhist(x) + dPdata(x))
(11)
and the minimum loss is
−2 ·δ(Pdata,PGhist)−
1
2λ
∫
(dPGhist(x)− dPdata(x))2
(dPGhist(x) + dPdata(x))
dx.
(12)
By letting λ −→ ∞, (12) gives the infinite well regular-
ization term which enforces −1 ≤ D ≤ 1, approaching
the solution of (6). This explains why the second term
vanishes when λ −→∞. In practice, for better results, we
allow a small trade-off between the two objectives with
λ = 10.
From now on, we will use the output of DTV as
anomaly score. In a nutshell, our method should fully dis-
criminate regions where data points are more dense than
synthetic anomalous points from PGhist . This yields a fast
feed-forward anomaly detector that ideally assigns −1 to
normal data and 1 to anomalous data. Fig. 1 shows an
example.
Our method also has the advantage of staying true to
the training objective, not modifying it as in [33]. Indeed,
the authors of [33] implement a similar method but using
a non-converged state of the generator as an anomaly gen-
erator. In order to achieve this, they add a term to the log
loss that prevents the model from converging all the way.
4 Model architecture and imple-
mentation details
In this section, the architecture and implementation of
each of the three steps detailed in Section 3 is described.
Architecture description. G uses transpose convolu-
tion to upscale the random features, Leaky ReLU non-
linearities and BatchNorm layers. D is a classic Con-
volutionnal Neural Network for classification, that uses
pooling downscaling, Leaky ReLU before passing the ob-
tained features through fully connected layers. Both G
and D roughly have 5M parameters. DTV has the same
architecture as D.
Learning to generate training-like data. We first
train until convergence of G and D according to the
WGAN-GP objective of Section 3.1 for a total of nepochs
epochs, and save the network states at regular intervals (50
times per epoch). We optimize our objective loss using
Adam optimizers, with decreasing learning rate initially
equal to 5 · 10−4.
Generator’s history probability distribution As an-
nounced in the previous section, if the training process
were to be continuous we would arbitrarily define PGhist
by (3), that is, PGhist =
∫ nepochs
α
c ·Gt(PZ) · e−βtdt, where
c is a normalization constant that makes PGhist sum to 1.
We avoid the first α epochs to avoid heavily biasing PGhist
in favour of the initial random state of the generator. The
exponential decay gives less importance to higher fidelity
samples at the end of the training. In practice, we ap-
proximate PGhist by sampling data from PGt where t is a
random variable of density of probability:
c · 1[α,nepochs] · e−βt (13)
Training our anomaly detectorDTV.
DTV is also optimized using Adam algorithm. Since it
has the same architecture as the discriminator used in the
previous WGAN training, its weights, denoted as WDTV ,
can be initialized as:
WDTV =
∫ nepochs
α
c ·WDt · e−βtdt, (14)
whereDt is the state of the WGAN discriminator at train-
ing time t. Let us comment on the reason of such ini-
tialization. Fig. 3(a) seems to indicate that averaging the
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Approximate density of score distribution among each
class of datasets (blue shades: MNIST, red shades:
KMNIST).
Red curve: Total Variation
distance minimisation.
Blue curve: AUPRC of the
model during training.
Histograms of anomaly
scores for the test splits of
MNIST and KMNIST.
One sample from each class of MNIST and KMNIST.
Figure 4: Method trained on MNIST (normal) and evalu-
ated on KMNIST (anomalous).
discriminators’ outputs is a good initialization. The ob-
tained average is indeed shaped as a ’v’ centered on the
real distribution in our toy example. Fig. 3(b) empirically
shows that the initialization of the discriminator with aver-
age coefficients is somewhat close to the average of said
discriminators. As explored in [47], this Deep Network
Interpolation is justified by the strong correlation of the
different states of a network during training. To further
discuss how good is exactly this initialization, Fig. 6 (blue
error bars in the figure) shows a comparison of area under
the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) with other methods
on the MNIST dataset. The x-axis indicates the MNIST
digit chosen as anomalous.
The following experimental cases are tested:
Figure 5: Method trained on MNIST (normal) and evalu-
ated on modified MNIST images for different levels σ of
gaussian additive noise.
• Experimental case 1: The training explained above
is implemented.
• Experimental case 2: The same process is applied,
only modifying PGhist , corrupting half generated im-
ages, by sampling the latent variable with a wider
distribution PZ′ :
PGhist =
∫ nepochs
α
c · Gt(PZ)+Gt(PZ′ )2 · e−βtdt.
The idea behind this is encouraging PGhist to spread
its mass further away from Pdata.
Fig. 1 was computed on experimental case 1 with
nepochs = 10, α = 1 and β = 5. Fig. 4, 5 and 6 were
computed with nepochs = 5, α = 1, β = 3.
5 Experimental Results and Discus-
sion
This section presents quantitative and qualitative experi-
mental results.
Our model behaves as one would expect when pre-
sented normal images modified with increasing levels of
noise, which is attributing an increasing anomaly score to
them. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 where a clear corre-
lation is seen between high values of the standard devia-
tion of the added Gaussian noise and high density of high
anomaly scores.
As a sanity check, we take the final state of the gener-
ator, trained on MNIST with (2) and [16] algorithm, and
verify that our method is able to detect generated sample
that do not belong to the normal MNIST distribution. In
Figure 7, we randomly select two latent variable (z1 and
z2) which are confidently classified as normal, then lin-
early interpolate all latent variables between them, given
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Figure 6: Comparison of AUPRC with other methods (x-axis denotes the MNIST digit chosen as anomalous).
Figure 7: Method trained on MNIST and evaluating
scores on images generated from interpolated latent vari-
ables (1− t)z1 + tz2, for t ∈ [0, 1].
by (1 − t)z1 + tz2,∀t ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we evaluate the
anomaly score of each generated image.
Finally we check the influence of the number of saves
per epoch on the performance of the model. Figure 8 dis-
plays the AUPRC of normal data (MNIST) against KM-
NIST dataset for different values of saving frequency dur-
ing WGAN training. For low values, the information car-
ried by PGhist starts at a ’early stopping of GANs’ ([21])
level, and gets richer as the number of saves per epoch
Figure 8: Influence of the number of checkpoints per
training epoch
increases; hence the increase in AUPRC. We do not have
an explanation for the small decay in performance for big
values.
Fig. 6 compares six state-of-the-art anomaly detection
methods with the presented method with both experimen-
tal cases and with our DTV initialization (denoted as
no training). Apart from a few digits, HistoryAD chal-
lenges state of the art anomaly detection methods. Fig. 4
shows the anomaly detection results when our method
was trained on MNIST dataset and evaluated on KM-
NIST. Notice that most of the histogram mass of normal
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and anomalous data is located around -1 and 1, respec-
tively. This figure empirically proves the robustness of
the method to anomalous data structurally close to train-
ing data. On the other hand, Fig. 1 shows how well
the method performs on structurally different data. Our
method was trained on Street View House Numbers [32],
and reached high AUPRC results. Both the approximate
density and the AUPRC comparison show that the pre-
sented method is able to discriminate anomalous from
normal data.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we presented our new anomaly detection ap-
proach, HistoryAD, and estimated its performance. Un-
like many GAN-based methods, we do not try to invert
the generator’s mapping, but use the rich information of
the whole training process, yielding an efficient and gen-
eral anomaly detector. Further can be done in exploiting
the training process of GANs, for instance, using multiple
training histories to improve the adversarial complexity of
PGhist .
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Appendix
The goal of this appendix is to obtain a solution of the
minimization problem
min
D
L(D) (15)
where L(D) is given by (10). Assuming that the probabil-
ity distributions Pdata and PGhist admit densities dPdata(x)
and dPGhist(x), respectively, the loss can be written as in-
tegral of the point-wise loss l defined below in (17):
L(D) =
∫
l(D(x))dx (16)
where
l(D(x)) =(dPdata(x)− dPGhist(x))D(x)
+ λ
dPdata(x) + dPGhist(x)
2
d(D(x), [−1, 1])2.
(17)
Let us recall that D∗TV = 1P − 1N where (P,N) is
the Hahn decomposition of dPGhist − dPdata (therefore,
sign(D∗TV ) = D
∗
TV ).
We notice that for all x and for all  > 0,
l[(1− )D∗TV (x)] ≥ (dPdata − dPGhist)(x)(1− )D∗TV (x)
(18)
> (dPdata − dPGhist)(x)D∗TV (x) (19)
i.e. > l[D∗TV (x)] (20)
Indeed, inequality (18) comes from the positivity of
the distance d(·, [−1, 1]). On the other hand, inequal-
ity (19) comes from the definition of D∗TV . Indeed, if
dPdata(x) − dPGhist(x) < 0, then D∗TV (x) = 1; the other
case dPdata(x) − dPGhist(x) > 0 gives D∗TV (x) = −1.
Either way, we obtain that (dPdata(x) − dPGhist(x))(1 −
)D∗TV (x) > (dPdata(x) − dPGhist(x))D∗TV (x). Finally,
inequality (20) is obtained from d(D∗TV (x), [−1, 1]) = 0.
We can always write a real function D as D = D∗TV +
∆, where ∆ is a certain function. We just proved that if
sign(∆(x)) = −sign(D∗TV (x)) on a non-negligible set,
then D cannot minimize (10), since D∗TV (x) achieves
lower value than D(x) on this set.
Hence all minimizer D∗ of (10) must be of the form
D∗(x) = (D∗TV + ∆)(x), where sign(∆) = sign(D
∗
TV )
almost everywhere. We can now re-write the point-wise
loss formula (17) as
l(D(x)) = (dPdata(x)− dPGhist(x)) · (D∗TV (x) + ∆(x))
(21)
+ λ
dPdata(x) + dPGhist(x)
2
∆(x)2(x) (22)
= −2 · δ(Pdata,PGhist) (23)
+
∫
(dPdata − dPGhist) ·∆ + λ
dPdata + dPGhist
2
∆2
(24)
Minimizing this point-wise second order equation in ∆,
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we obtain
∆∗(x) =
dPGhist(x)− dPdata(x)
λ(dPGhist(x) + dPdata(x))
. (25)
Finally, the minimum loss is
−2 ·δ(Pdata,PGhist)−
1
2λ
∫
(dPGhist(x)− dPdata(x))2
(dPGhist(x) + dPdata(x))
dx.
(26)
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